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THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990: A LONG TIME COMING
INTRODUCTION
In March, 1967, the tanker SS Torrey Canyon rammed into the Seven
Stones Reef, sending over 800,000 barrels of Kuwaiti crude into interna-
tional waters sixteen miles west of Lands End off the southwest coast of
England.' The spill, One of the most catastrophic of its time, was fol-
lowed two years later by a major blowout2 in United States waters. That
accident released 230,000 gallons of oil into California's Santa Barbara
Channel.' The Torrey Canyon incident shocked the national and inter-
national community and prompted calls for measures to prevent future
disastrous spills.4 There were, unfortunately, other significant oil spills
between these two incidents,5 but the Torrey Canyon disaster and the
Santa Barbara blowout forced the United States to take a hard look at its
own policies toward oil spill disasters in general and those occurring
close to home in particular.6
Much legislation has been enacted, and amended, since 1967 to ad-
dress oil spills and the damages they cause to the marine environment
and to public and private property. A review of legislation currently on
the books reveals that much of it has been too little, too late. The 1989
Exxon Valdez spill demonstrated the inadequacy of laws enacted prior to
1990 to respond to massive spills on the magnitude of the Valdez in
terms of penalties and compensation.
Few would argue that the problem has reached critical proportions.
Over 10,000 oil spills were reported each year between 1973 and 1985. 7
Some 32 million gallons of oil were discharged into United States waters
1. The Torrey Canyon, Report of the Committee of Scientists on the Scientific and
Technological Aspects of the Torrey Canyon Disaster, 5 (1967).
2. A blowout is the uncontrolled eruption of gas or oil from a well. It can result
from pressure imbalances caused by drilling mud that is too light in weight or by pulling
up the drill pipe too fast. R. EASTON, BLACK TIDE: THE SANTA BARBARA OIL SPILL
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 8 (1972).
3. The oil flow, lasting from January 28 to February 7, was estimated at a rate of
21,000 gallons per day. See R. EASTON, supra note 2, at 8.
4. The British government expressed its concerns to the Third Extraordinary Ses-
sion of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) and sug-
gested measures to prevent another Torrey Canyon incident from occurring. The
concerns were forwarded to the appropriate committees with an eye toward incorporat-
ing them into future international agreements. Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37
FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 193-94 (1968).
5. Between March 18, 1967, the date of the Torrey Canyon grounding and January
28, 1969, when the Santa Barbara spill occurred, there were approximately thirteen major
spills worldwide, including the grounding of the R.C. Stoner in September, 1967, off
Wake Island; the Pegasos in February, 1968, off Cape Hatteras, N.C.; the Tim, also in
February, 1968, near Philadelphia, Pa.; and the General Colocotronis in March, 1968,
near Eleuthera Island, Bahamas, which released between 21,000 and 37,700 barrels of
Venezuelan crude. See R. EASTON, supra note 2 at 294-95.
6. Nanda & Stiles, Offshore Oil Spills.: An Evaluation of Recent United States Re-
sponses, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519, 528-36 (1970).
7. 135 CONG. REC. S9678 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989).
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by tankers, barges and other vessels between 1984 and 1988.8 In the
twenty-four-hour period following the Valdez spill alone, there were
three major oil spills from tankers in United States coastal waters. 9 The
questions asked after each disaster are always the same: How could it
have been prevented? Why does present legislation fail to adequately ad-
dress the costs of clean-up, to provide for realistic compensation, or to
impose more stringent standards of liability?
Perhaps the Valdez was the last straw, for it galvanized a Congress
previously content to quarrel over those questions.° Oil spill compensa-
tion and liability bills11 passed both houses of Congress in the fall of
1989. The House version was adopted by the Senate and, after some
months of wrangling in conference committee, was signed into law by
President Bush on August 18, 1990, as the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.12
This note reviews previous legislation and examines key provisions of the
Oil Pollution Act and whether it will provide a working solution to the
nation's oil spill crisis.
I. PREVIOUS LEGISLATION
It has been said that "the present patchwork of federal and state laws
is unwieldy, inconsistent, inefficient and unnecessarily expensive." 3
Federal statutes alone provide for varying degrees of liability and com-
pensation for various vessels carrying various cargoes in various waters.
Determining which statute to apply, and when, can be as confusing as
sorting out the conflicts between them.
A. The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (The Refuse Act)14 is very nearly
a relic among environmental statutes, but it can be useful in a modem
8. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, COAST GUARD, POLLUTING INCI-
DENTS IN AND AROUND U.S. WATERS, 1984, 1985, 1986.
9. 135 CONG. REC. S9678 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989).
10. The Senate and House have been unable to agree on comprehensive oil spill legis-
lation for almost fourteen years. Preemption of state law is a major issue of debate.
Montana's Senator Baucus recently remarked, "The majority leader, for 8 years has at-
tempted to pass an oil spill bill. He has had a difficult time in large respect because the
other body has a very different view on what should be contained in that bill. The basic
difference between this body and that body has been preemption of State law .... The
other body would like preemption. The other body would like to make it difficult for the
States to have their own separate liability laws. It has been a very difficult issue in dealing
with the other body." 135 CONG. REC. S10080 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989) (statement of
Sen. Baucus).
11. S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
12. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990).
13. Bagwell, Liability Under United States Law for Spills of Oil or Chemicals From
Vessels, 4 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 496, 496 n.1. (1987) (citing Letter of Graydon S.
Staring, President, The Maritime Law Ass'n of the United States, to Hon. Gerry. E.
Studds, Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation, Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, U.S. House of Representatives, May 31, 1985).
14. 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411, 412 (1986).
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catastrophe.1" Under the Refuse Act it is a misdemeanor to discharge
refuse matter of any kind into the navigable waters of the United
States.16 Violations are punishable by a fine of not more than $2,500.17
The Refuse Act addresses only intentional violations and does not men-
tion discharges resulting from negligence.18 Though penalties assessed
for damages incurred are supposed to be used to "improve" the harbor in
which the damage occurred, no criteria are provided for the improve-
ments, and, the penalty amount is outdated. In this day and age, $2,500
would accomplish very little in the way of "improvements" or
compensation.' 9
B. The Intervention on the High Seas Act
The Intervention on the High Seas Act2" (High Seas Act) imposes pen-
alties for discharges21 of "convention oil"'22 that present a grave and im-
minent danger 23 to the coastline or related interests of the United States.
It authorizes the United States to take whatever measures may be neces-
sary to prevent, mitigate, or eliminate the danger (e.g., sinking the
ship). 4 The maximum penalty for violators is a $10,000 fine, one year in
prison, or both.25 The High Seas Act applies only to spills that occur on
the high seas.26
15. Violation of the Refuse Act, for example, is one of the charges in the Department
of Justice's criminal suit against Exxon. United States v. Exxon Corp., No. 90-015 (D.
Alaska filed Feb. 27, 1990). Recovery under both the Refuse Act and the Clean Water
Act has not been permitted by the courts, which concluded that Congress intended the
Clean Water Act to "provide the exclusive remedy for the government to recover its oil
spill cleanup costs." United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 627 F.2d 736, 739 (5th Cir.
1980).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1986).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1986).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 412 (1986).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 412 (1986).
20. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1471, 1472 (1986).
21. Discharges include, but are not limited to, "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pour-
ing, emitting, emptying, or dumping into the marine environment of quantities of oil
determined to be harmful" by the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). 33 U.S.C. § 1517(m)(3) (1986).
22. Convention oil is defined as crude oil, fuel oil, diesel oil, and lubricating oil. 33
U.S.C. § 1471(3) (1986).
23. "Grave and imminent danger" is determined by the Secretary of the department
in which the Coast Guard is operating and is measured by a host of factors, including the
effects of the spill on human health, fish, shellfish, and other living marine resources,
wildlife, coastal zone and estuarine activities, and public and private shorelines and
beaches. 33 U.S.C. § 1473 (1986).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1472 (1986).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1481 (1986).
26. The high seas are waters which are open to all states and over which no state has
jurisdiction. Art. 87, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done at Montego
Bay, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982); U.N. Pub. E. 83.V.5 (1983). The Convention
is not yet in force. Sixty ratifications are required.
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C. The Deepwater Port Act of 1974
The Deepwater Port Act2" prohibits discharges of oil into the marine
environment from a vessel within any safety zone.2" Violators are as-
sessed a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation.29
Clean-up costs are assumed by the government via the Deepwater Port
Liability Fund,30 unless the Secretary of Transportation determines that
the "removal will be done properly and expeditiously by the licensee of
the deepwater port or the owner or operator of the vessel from which the
discharge occurs."31 Unless the owner/operator can prove he is not lia-
ble through one of the enumerated defenses,32 he will be held jointly and
severally liable, without regard to fault, for up to $20 million of the
clean-up costs and damages resulting from the spill. If the spill resulted
from gross negligence or willful misconduct within the privity and
knowledge of the owner/operator, the owner/operator can be held
jointly and severally liable for the full costs of clean-up and damages.33
D. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act34 is arguably one of the
strongest acts devised to deal with oil spills. Its application, however, is
limited to discharges of oil that has been transported through the trans-
Alaska pipeline. A holder of a pipeline right-of-way will be held strictly
liable for damages unless the holder can show that the damage resulted
from an act of war, negligence of the United States or other government
entity, or the damaged party.35 Owner/operators of a vessel carrying
such oil may be held strictly liable, jointly and severally, for all damages
and clean-up costs sustained by any person or entity.36 Liability for
holders of a pipeline right-of-way for damages is limited to $350 million
for any one incident.37 The liability cap is $100 million for any one inci-
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1501 (1975)(amended 1984).
28. Safety zone is defined as a "zone of appropriate size around and including any
deepwater port for the purpose of navigational safety." 33 U.S.C. § 1509(d)(1) (1975).
The zone is designated by the Secretary of Transportation. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1502(16),
1509(d) (1975).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1517(a)(2) (1975).
30. Monies for the fund are obtained from the owner of any oil loaded or unloaded at
the deepwater port through a surcharge of two cents per barrel. Bunker or fuel oil and oil
transported through the trans-Alaska pipeline are exempt. 33 U.S.C. § 1517(f)(3)
(1975).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1517(c) (1975).
32. Defenses cited by the statute are (1) an act of war, (2) negligence of the federal
government in establishing and maintaining aids to navigation, or (3) negligence of the
claimant. 33 U.S.C. § 151 7(g) (1975).
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1517(d) (1975).
34. 43 U.S.C. § 1651 (1973).
35. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(1), (a)(2) (1973).
36. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (1973).
37. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(2) (1973), amended by Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-380, § 8101(b), 104 Stat. 484, 565 (1990).
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dent for the owner/operator of a vessel."8 The owner/operator must pay
the first $14 million of allowable claims; the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Fund
assumes the balance.39
E. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act' prohibits discharges of oil
from any offshore facility or vessel in quantities which the President finds
harmful, as defined under the Clean Water Act.4 Owner/operators of
vessels other than public vessels and owner/operators of offshore facili-
ties can be held jointly, severally, and strictly liable for removal costs and
damages, including injury, destruction, or loss of use of real or personal
property and natural resources, as well as for lost profits and tax reve-
nues. The liability cap is $250,000 or $300 per gross ton, whichever is
greater, for vessels, and $35 million in the case of an offshore facility.42
The Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund is available to handle
removal costs and may not exceed $200 million.43
F. The Federal Water Pollution and Control Acts of 1972 and 1977
Better known as the Clean Water Act (CWA)," the much-amended
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) has been the best overall
solution for dealing with those responsible for polluting the nation's wa-
ters with oil and other hazardous substances.
Section 1321 of the CWA prohibits harmful discharges of oil into the
navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, the waters of
the contiguous zone, or in connection with activities under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act 5 or the Deepwater Port Act.46 What con-
stitutes a harmful discharge is determined by the President and his deci-
sion is based on the effect of the spill on the public health or welfare, fish
38. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(3) (1973).
39. Id. A fee of five cents per barrel is collected from the owner of the oil at the time it
is loaded on the vessel. Monies in the fund cannot exceed $100 million. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1653(c)(5) (1973).
40. 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1978).
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982).
42. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1813-14 (1978), repealed by Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-380, § 2004, 104 Stat. 484, 507 (1990).
43. The monies for the fund are obtained through a fee not to exceed three cents per
barrel on oil obtained from the Outer Continental Shelf. The fee is imposed on the owner
of the oil. 43 U.S.C. § 1812(d)(1), repealed by Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
380, § 2004, 104 Stat. 484, 507 (1990).
44. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1972).
45. These activities include exploration, development, and production of the minerals
of the outer Continental Shelf, which means "all submerged lands lying seaward and
outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters as defined in section 1301 of this
title, and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject
to its jurisdiction and control." 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1978).
46. Discharges within a safety zone or in connection with mining activities on the
outer continental shelf. 33 U.S.C. § 1517(a)(1) (1975), repealed by Oil Pollution Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 2003(a)(2), 104 Stat. 484, 507 (1990).
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and shellfish, wildlife, and public and private property.47 The President
is authorized to remove or arrange for the removal of the oil, unless he
determines that the clean-up will be properly done by the owner/opera-
tor of the vessel.4" Critics of the statute charge that the power given to
the President is too discretionary, and that the statute should more force-
fully direct the President to initiate clean-up of oil spills, unless he specif-
ically determines it will be done properly and promptly by the owner/
operator of the vessel.49
Liability for civil penalties extends to the owner, operator, or any per-
son in charge of a vessel.5° Civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day of
violation or an amount up to $1,000 per barrel of oil may be imposed on
owner/operators or persons in charge of the vessel. 1 Persons who fail to
carry out removal of the oil may be subject to civil penalties of up to
$25,000 per day of violation or an amount up to three times the costs
incurred by the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.52 Criminal penalties of
fines in accordance with Title 18, United States Code, 5 years in prison,
or both, can be imposed for failure to notify the government of a
discharge.53
Violators also may be liable for actual costs of clean-up undertaken by
the United States government in the amount of $125 per gross ton for an
inland oil barge, or $125,000, whichever is greater, and $150 per gross
ton for vessels carrying oil as cargo, or $250,000, whichever is greater.54
When the spill is the result of gross negligence or willful misconduct,
civil penalties of not less than $100,000 and not more than $3,000 per
barrel of oil may be assessed. 55 Clean-up by the government is paid for
through a revolving fund established in the Treasury.5 6
Because the FWPCA does not preempt state tort law for damage com-
pensation,57 individual states are free to impose their own requirements
or liabilities with respect to the discharge of oil. The problem with the
imposition of state liabilities or of maritime tort penalties under federal
admiralty law, however, is that these liabilities are subject to the limita-
tion of shipowners' liability.58 Twenty-four states currently have laws to
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(4) (1982).
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1) (1982).
49. 135 CONG. REC. S3240 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(A) (1982).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A) (1982), amended by Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-380, § 4301(b), 104 Stat. 484, 533-34 (1990).
52. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(B) (1982), amended by Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-380, § 4301(b), 104 Stat. 484, 533-34 (1990).
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1982), amended by Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-380, § 4301(a)(2), 104 Stat. 484, 533 (1990).
54. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1)(c) (1982).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(D) (1982), amended by Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-380, § 4301(b), 104 Stat. 484, 533 (1990).
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(k) (1982).
57. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o)(2) (1982).
58. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 183-89. But see U.S. v. M/V Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.
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deal with oil and hazardous substance pollution,59 and nineteen of these
states have statutes that place no limits on liability.'
The FWPCA also provides guidelines for the establishment of a Na-
tional Contingency Plan for removal of oil and hazardous substances.6'
II. THE EXXON VALDEZ
A. "The Largest Single Tanker Oil Spill in US. History "62
In 1977 the Coast Guard estimated that roughly 85 percent of tanker
accidents occur as the result of human error or misjudgment.63 The
Valdez accident is attributed to both.
Just after midnight on the morning of Friday, March 24, 1989, the
supertanker Exxon Valdez left the port of Valdez, bound for Long
Beach, California. To avoid ice encountered on the inbound voyage to
Port Valdez, the tanker, with an uncertified third mate at its helm and
with the permission of the Coast Guard, veered from the standard out-
bound shipping lanes of Alaska's Prince William Sound to the inbound
lanes. The third mate failed to return the tanker to the outbound lanes in
1982), where the court held that the United States could seek recovery of clean-up ex-
penses under the Clean Water Act but did not have a cause of action for recovery of
clean-up expenses based on maritime tort or on the Refuse Act.
59. States that have oil pollution statutes include Alabama, Alaska, California, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. U.S.
COAST GUARD, OIL SPILL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION LEGISLATIVE PRF-EMPTION
CONSIDERATIONS, APP. A. (Mar. 1, 1985). The New York statute prohibits the dis-
charge of oil or petroleum of any kind and in any form. Violators of the statute are
"strictly liable, without regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal costs and all direct
and indirect damages, no matter by whom sustained." The liability cap is $50 million for
each major facility or $300/gross ton for each vessel. Discharges that result from war,
sabotage, or governmental negligence are exempt from liability. N.Y. NAy. LAW §§ 173,
181 (McKinney 1977). The New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act prohibits
the discharge of harmful substances, including petroleum. The statute imposes strict lia-
bility, without regard to fault, for "all cleanup and removal costs and for all direct and
indirect damages no matter by whom sustained." Liability cannot exceed $50 million for
major facilities or $150/gross ton for each vessel. These limits do not apply if the dis-
charge is the result of gross negligence. War, sabotage, and acts of God are the sole
defenses. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.1 lb, 58:10-23.1 lc, 58:10-23.1 lg (West 1976).
60. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, at A32, col. 1. At least 14 coastal states have no limit
on liability in the event of an oil spill, according to a 1983 survey of state oil spill laws.
Both Alaska and Maine, for example, have an unlimited, strict joint and several liability
standard. U.S. COAST GUARD, OIL SPILL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION LEGISLA-
TIVE PRE-EMPTION CONSIDERATIONS, APP. A. (Mar. 1, 1985).
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c) (1982).
62. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1989, at Al, col. 2.
63. Coast Guard Efforts to Prevent Oil Pollution Caused By Tanker Accidents.: Hear-
ings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations, House of Representa-
tives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 35 (1977) (statement of Rear Admiral William M. Benkert,
Chief, Office of Merchant Marine Safety, U.S. Coast Guard) [hereinafter "Coast Guard
Efforts"].
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time to avoid running aground on Bligh Reef.'
The Valdez was carrying a load of 1,260,000 barrels of North Slope
crude oil. The grounding ruptured eleven of the Valdez' sixteen tanks
spilling about 258,000 barrels of crude, or approximately 11 million gal-
lons,65 into Alaska's Prince William Sound, one of the nation's most bio-
logically productive waters.66 By the evening of the 24th, the spill, called
the largest in United States history,67 was approximately five miles long
and 500 feet wide. Time is of the essence when an oil spill occurs, for oil
spreads rapidly and drifts with the wind, surface currents, waves, and
tides. By Sunday, the 26th, the oil had spread over 100 square miles; by
Wednesday, 500 square miles. By Friday, one week after the accident,
the oil had traveled 90 miles from its origin, covered 850 square miles,
and threatened fisheries off the Kenai Peninsula.68
B. Clean-Up
Six contingency plans are in place specifically to respond to oil spills in
Prince William Sound.69 The first line of defense was to come from the
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company.70 Charged by the state of Alaska
with preparing and implementing the initial response to oil spills, Aly-
eska incorporated federal requirements into their plan regarding terminal
and tanker operations.
According to the plan, Alyeska "will direct clean-up operations of
spills from tankers carrying trans-Alaska Pipeline System oil through
64. A report by the National Safety Transportation Board found that the decision of
the vessel's master to leave the third mate in charge of navigation was improper, "given
the course of the vessel, the uncertain extent of the ice conditions, and the proximity of a
dangerous reef." The report also determined that the third mate did not have the re-
quired pilotage endorsement and that his performance was probably hampered by fatigue.
In addition, the report concluded that partial responsibility for the accident rested on the
shoulders of the U.S. Coast Guard for inadequately tracking the vessel through Prince
William Sound. National Transportation Board, Conclusions, at 285, 289 (July 31,
1990).
65. Each barrel of oil contains 42 United States gallons at 60 degrees Fahrenheit. 33
U.S.C. § 1321(a)(13) (1982).
66. "Valdez Winter Update," Exxon Corporation (Oct. 25, 1989) (videotape).
67. The Amoco Cadiz spill on March 16, 1978, off the French coast was larger. The
next worst spill in the United States occurred in December, 1976. The Argo Merchant
spilled approximately 160,000 barrels of oil off the southeastern coast of Massachusetts.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1989, at Al, col. 2. The Argo Merchant spill initiated the legisla-
tive efforts that culminated in the 1990 Oil Pollution Act.
68. 135 CONG. REC. S3240 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
69. These plans are: the National Contingency Plan created by the Clean Water Act,
the Alaska Regional Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, the
Alaska State Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, the Coast
Guard Marine Safety Office plan for the Port of Valdez, the oil industry's Alyeska Con-
tingency Plan for Prince William Sound, and the Exxon Plan. THE NATIONAL RE-
SPONSE TEAM, THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, at 5-8.
70. The Alyeska Pipeline Service Company is a consortium formed in 1970 by a
group of oil companies to build and maintain the trans-Alaska pipeline. "Valdez Winter
Update," Exxon Corporation (Oct. 25, 1989) (videotape).
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Prince William Sound in such a way as to make federal or state interven-
tion or takeovers unnecessary."71 But the much-heralded contingency
plans failed. Emergency crews were to be deployed within five hours of
any spill occurring within a thirty- to forty-mile radius of the Port of
Valdez; however, the crews did not arrive until fourteen hours after the
spill, which occurred twenty-five miles from the Port. Booms were not
deployed to surround the crippled Valdez for another twenty-one
hours.72 Even though the National Safety Transportation Board found
that "there was no evidence that the Federal Government (U.S. Coast
Guard) or any other organization would have been capable of increasing
the efforts underway during the first twenty-four hours after the spill,"73
the fact that proper procedures were not followed is distressing.
The Exxon Corporation immediately accepted full responsibility for
the spill.74 They later assumed responsibility for the clean-up from Aly-
eska and promised to pay the cost of what would almost certainly turn
out to be a monumental effort.7 5 As Richard Golub, publisher of
Golub's Oil Pollution Bulletin, pointed out,
As a result of the size and immediate environment of this incident [the
spill occurred in a sheltered body of water containing islands, bays and
fjords] it will likely turn into a cleanup nightmare. The initial effort to
contain the spill entails the use of floating booms to keep oil in a lim-
ited area. Then ropes or disks, treated with chemicals that attract oil,
are swept through the spill, wrung out and then redeployed. If this
proves ineffective, chemical dispersers can be used to break up the oil
into small particles, enabling it to mix with the water.
7 6
Exxon began its removal operation on Sunday, the 26th, but its efforts
were hampered by the remote location of the spill, inclement weather,
and clean-up methods that are more than a decade old. The inadequacy
of methods used by the oil industry has been commented on in the recent
and not so recent past. For example, Senator Alan Cranston remarked
in 1969 that
[t]he oil industry in the United States is one of the most advanced
industries in the world. It is able to find and produce oil at incredible
depths undersea or underland, but this industry has not until now
turned its immense skills to dealing with the mess that afflicts us when
a spill occurs in the ocean. The most primitive measures are presently
available .... They have consisted of throwing straw on the surface of
the sea .... Another method was to float a boom around the oil to
surround it or to prevent it from coming into a harbor. When heavy
weather came, the boom was upset and shortly looked like spaghetti.
71. THE NATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM, supra note 69, at 6 (May 1989).
72. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Prince William Sound Envtl. Reader 1989, 3.
73. National Safety Transportation Board, Conclusion, at 285, 289 (July 31, 1990).
74. Remarks by L.R. Raymond, President of Exxon Corporation, to the University
Club, New York (Oct. 24, 1989).
75. THE NATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM, supra note 69, at 13 (May 1989).
76. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1989, at Al, col. 2.
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Of course the oil and debris went in every direction.77
Twenty years later Senator John H. Chafee echoed Senator Cranston's
words, pointing out that
[o]ne of the things we have discovered is that we just do not know how
to deal with spills.... [W]e have booms that go out around the vessel,
where the spill is identified to be, but these booms are remarkably inef-
fective. The oil either goes over them or under them. 78
Booms, however, were the cornerstone of Exxon's efforts, and even
these were slow to arrive on the scene. Additional equipment that could
have proved helpful was not immediately available. Operations to off-
load the remaining oil on the Valdez did not begin until 7:36 a.m. on
Saturday, March 25th, and, as noted earlier, the Valdez itself was not
surrounded by containment booms for another three and a half hours.7 9
The use of dispersants was considered 30 minutes after the spill was re-
ported, but when the federal on-scene coordinator advised Alyeska to
start the dispersant-use request process, Alyeska had fewer than 4,000
gallons of dispersant on hand, no dispersant application equipment, and
no aircraft. 0 At least four trial test applications were approved, but un-
satisfactory results prompted abandonment of its use. Heroic efforts
were made to salvage wildlife, birds, and marine life affected by the oil,
but these efforts proved only moderately successful.8"
C. The Aftermath
Exxon maintained in July, 1989, that its goal "is to leave the water and
shorelines in an environmentally stable condition such that animals,
birds, and fish are not harmed and no restrictions on commercial use or
subsistence hunting and fishing are necessary. ' '8 2 According to the
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, 1,245 miles of
shoreline were oiled by the spill. At the beginning of 1990 approximately
100 miles of beach remained oiled, 20 miles of which posed a threat to
wildlife.8 3 In April 20, 1990, Exxon reported that 574 miles of shoreline
had been inspected, 65 percent of which showed no evidence of surface
oil. There was very light oiling on 130 miles of shoreline and a narrow to
wide band of weathered crude along 72 miles of shoreline.8 4 Exxon,
which suspended its initial efforts in mid-September, 1989, totaled the
77. Santa Barbara Oil Spill: Hearings on S.1219 Before the Subcomm. on Minerals,
Materials, and Fuels of the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. Senate, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., at 12 (1969).
78. 135 CONG. REC. S9691 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
79. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Prince William Sound Envtl. Reader 1989, 2-3.
80. THE NATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM, supra note 69, at 17 (May 1989).
81. N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1990, at A8, col. 4. A recently released report by Interna-
tional Wildlife Research states that of the otters captured and treated in the first weeks
after the spill, over 60 percent died. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1990, at C4, col. 1.
82. News, Exxon Company, U.S.A. (July 28, 1989) (press release).
83. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1990, at A16, col. 1.
84. News, Exxon Company, U.S.A. (Apr. 27, 1990) (press release).
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cost of the unfinished effort at over $2 billion.85 The company ended its
second clean-up campaign in September, 1990. A preliminary survey of
128 miles of shoreline found "some 61 miles of shores in Prince William
Sound and the Kodiak and Kenai regions remain oiled. Less than four of
those miles are considered 'heavily' oiled, and most of those are in Prince
William Sound.",8 6
The full extent of the damage to Prince William Sound remains to be
determined. Losses to the state's marine environment include over
33,000 birds, more than 1,000 marine mammals, and 138 eagles.8 7 The
Sound's $12-million herring fishery was closed by the state for the season
in April, 1989. Salmon fisheries in the path of the spill were closed for
the year in mid-June, 1989.88 In June, 1990, two areas in Prince William
Sound were closed to commercial salmon fishing because of oil remaining
on the beaches.89 A study released by the Alaska Department of Conser-
vation indicated that the oil may have long-term chronic effects on inter-
tidal, subtidal, and anadromous fish and, in some cases, may reduce the
reproductive potential of the fish.90 Exxon cites a record-setting 1990
fishing season in Prince William Sound as evidence of a comeback in the
area.91 In addition, a scientific report commissioned by Exxon on the
environmental recovery in Prince William Sound, notes there are "abun-
dant signs of plant and animal life, and recovery is well under way on
even the most severely impacted beaches." Drawing on field observa-
tions of the marine animal population in Prince William Sound, the re-
port concludes that "the overall impact of the oil spill on the
environment in Prince William Sound and Gulf of Alaska is likely to be
short-lived." 92
Years of litigation lay in the wake of the Valdez. As of September,
1990, 150 lawsuits had been filed against Exxon by the state of Alaska,
the United States Government, Alaskan fishermen, and others affected
by the Exxon Valdez spill.9 3 On February 28, 1990, following failure to
agree on the terms of a plea bargain with Exxon, the United States De-
partment of Justice announced the indictment of Exxon and its shipping
subsidiary on five criminal counts stemming from the Valdez spill. 94 On
85. Exxon Announces 1990 General Plan - March Planning Document (Mar. 15,
1990) (press release).
86. State of Alaska, Office of the Governor (Sept. 13, 1990) (press release).
87. Satchell & Carpenter, A Disaster That Wasn't, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept.
18, 1989, at 60, 62, 64.
88. Interview with Mark Kuwada, liaison, Department of Fish and Game, State of
Alaska (Oct. 8, 1990).
89. Oil Spill Chronicle, No. 19, at 1-2 (June 14, 1990).
90. Weekly Report, Oil Spill Response Center, State of Alaska, Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation, 4 (Aug. 29-Sept. 4, 1990).
91. News, Exxon Company, U.S.A. (Sept. 13, 1990) (press release).
92. Baker, Clark, & Kingston, Environmental Recovery in Prince William Sound and
The Gulf of Alaska, INSTITUTE OF OFFSHORE ENGINEERING, 3 (June 1990).
93. Nat'l L.J., Sept. 17, 1990, at 3.
94. The indictment charges Exxon with a felony violation of the Ports and Water-
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October 1, 1990, Exxon filed claims against the Federal government for
costs of the spill, charging that the United States Coast Guard was re-
sponsible for the accident.95
The inadequacy of Alyeska's contingency plans is the subject of much
concern. The plans, approved by Alaska's Department of Environmental
Conservation, required Alyeska to keep on hand four small oil skimmers,
a barge, and 11,500 feet of boom to contain possible oil spills. Alyeska,
having projected that a catastrophic spill would occur only once every
241 years, was prepared for a spill of only about 1,000 to 2,000 barrels.
The plan, in retrospect, has been called "the biggest piece of maritime
fiction since Moby Dick." 96 Experts in the oil industry have warned in
the Valdez aftermath that the "industry should set in place and keep at
ready the clean-up gear that everyone thought was at hand at Valdez-
but wasn't. The equipment and its operators should be tested regularly.
It should be sufficient to handle the worst possible spill caused by the
least probable misstep."'97
The spill also underscored the limits of even great sums of money in
environmental catastrophe when technology is unavailable or nonexis-
tent. Exxon's most recent tally sheet shows expenditures of over $2 bil-
lion. It is an expenditure well removed from any penalties Exxon would
have been required to pay under current legislation, short a finding of
negligence. The government has estimated that even a doubling of antic-
ipated penalties under the Alternative Fines Act would result in a pay-
ment by Exxon of only about $700 million.9
New solutions were necessary, and the Valdez spill, having focused the
nation's attention on the calamitous damages resulting from oil spills,
has forced a tentative Congress to act on the oil spill legislation it has
quarreled over for the past fourteen years.
III. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
Every major oil spill has spawned heated congressional debate over
comprehensive oil spill legislation. The debate lasts a short time then
ways Safety Act, which requires that a competent person man the wheelhouse; a felony
violation of the Dangerous Cargo Act, which prohibits the hiring of physically or men-
tally impaired crew members; violation of the Refuse Act, which prohibits negligent dis-
charges of foreign substances into the water; and illegally killing migratory birds, a
misdemeanor under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. United States v. Exxon Corp., No.
90-015 (D. Alaska filed Feb. 27, 1990). Captain Joseph Hazelwood, former captain of the
Valdez, was convicted of the misdemeanor of negligent discharge of oil on March 22,
1990, and sentenced to 1,000 hours of community service cleaning the beaches of Prince
William Sound and ordered to pay $50,000 in restitution to the state of Alaska. Hazel-
wood was acquitted of three more serious charges of reckless endangerment, criminal
mischief, and operating a vessel while intoxicated. State of Alaska v. Hazelwood, 3AN
S89-7218 (Super.Ct.), March 22, 1990.
95. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1990, at A19, col. 3.
96. See Satchell & Carpenter, supra note 87 at 60, 68.
97. Oil & Gas J., Apr. 10, 1989, at 11.
98. United States v. Exxon Corp., No. 90-015 (D. Alaska filed Feb. 27, 1990).
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dies down. Most members of the House and Senate have agreed over the
years that such a law is needed. What they could not agree on until this
year was what it should contain. The Oil Pollution Act of 199099 (OPA)
was signed into law on August 18, 1990. Some key details of the OPA
follow.
A. Provisions of the OPA
1. Prohibited Discharges
The OPA imposes liability on each responsible party"° of a vessel or
facility that discharges' 0 ' oil or that poses a substantial threat of oil dis-




The responsible party of a vessel or facility from which oil is dis-
charged is liable for all removal costs'03 incurred by the United States
Government, a State, or Indian tribe, and any removal cost incurred by
any person, including, but not limited to, any State for all damages for
economic loss or loss of natural resources resulting from such a dis-
charge. Removal costs per incident cannot exceed $1,200 per gross ton
for a tanker vessel. In the case of a vessel greater than 3,000 gross ton,
the cap is $1,200 per gross ton or $10 million, whichever is greater, and
in the case of a vessel 3,000 gross ton or less, the cap is $1,200 per gross
ton or $2 million, whichever is greater. Other vessels are liable for up to
$600 per gross ton or $500,000, whichever is greater. '0
There is no cap on liability for discharges that are the result of willful
misconduct or gross negligence or of a violation of applicable safety, con-
struction, or operating standards or regulations.'0 5
99. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990).
100. Responsible party means any person owning or operating a vessel, or demise char-
tering the vessel; in the case of an onshore facility, any person owning or operating the
facility; in offshore facilities, the lessee or permittee of the area in which the facility is
located or the holder of a right of use; the licensee in the case of a deepwater port; owner/
operator in the case of a pipeline; and in the case of abandonment, those who would have
been responsible parties immediately prior to the abandonment of the vessel or facility.
Id. § 1001(32), 104 Stat. 484, 488-89.
101. "Discharge is defined as any emission (other than natural seepage), intentional or
unintentional, and includes, but is not limited to, spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, or dumping." Id. § 1001(7), 104 Stat. 484, 486.
102. Id. § 1002(a), 104 Stat. 484, 489.
103. Removal costs are defined as "costs of removal that are incurred after a discharge
of oil has occurred, or in any case in which there is a substantial threat of a discharge of
oil, the costs to prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil pollution from such an incident." Id.
§ 1001(31), 104 Stat. 484, 488.
104. Id. § 1004(a), 104 Stat. 484, 491-92.
105. Id. § 1004 (c)(I)(A),(B), 104 Stat. 484, 492.
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3. Financial Responsibility
Owners or operators of any vessel over 300 gross tons who use any
place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or operate in the
waters of the exclusive economic zone must establish and maintain evi-
dence of financial responsibility to meet the maximum amount of
liability. 10 6
4. Defenses
Owners or operators of a vessel who can show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the spill occurred through an act of God, an act of war,
or an act or omission of a third party other than a responsible party,
employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission
occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, are exempt from
liability. 17 Interestingly, the OPA does not provide negligence of the
United States or other government entity as a defense. In the Valdez
litigation, Exxon charges the U.S. Coast Guard with responsibility for
the accident. Apparently, under the OPA, this would not relieve Exxon
from liability, unless the U.S. Coast Guard could be deemed a third
party.
The OPA does, however, provide that the United States government
would not be liable for damages resulting from "its actions or omissions
relating to any response plan" under the national planning and response
system. 10 8
5. The Fund
At least five federal statutes'0 9 address oil spill liability and compensa-
tion, and provide for special funds to pay clean-up costs and compensa-
tion. The OPA amends the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, " established
by the Treasury, which can be used to pay federal removal costs; costs
for assessing injury to natural resources resulting from a discharge; costs
for restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of any
natural resources injured, destroyed, or lost as a result of a discharge of
oil; and costs incurred by any state in responding to a discharge and
reimbursement for removal costs or damages. The maximum amount to
be used for any single discharge is $1 billion. Through conforming
amendments to the OPA the various oil spill liability funds existing
106. Id. § 1016, 104 Stat. 484, 502.
107. Id. § 1003, 104 Stat. 484, 491.
108. Id. § 4202(H)(8), 104 Stat. 484, 531.
109. Among the statutes that relate to oil spill liability and compensation are: The
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (The Refuse Act); Intervention on the
High Seas Act; Deepwater Port Act of 1974; The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization
Act; The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act; The Clean Water Act.
110. 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (1986).
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under other legislation now feed into one."'
6. Preemption of State Law
The longstanding dispute on this issue between the houses of Congress
has finally been resolved. States will not be preempted from imposing
additional liability or requirements with regard to oil pollution or dis-
charge within the state or to removal costs. 12 The House and Senate
hearings discussed this point and reasoned that states should not be lim-
ited by constraints in federal legislation and are entitled to choose a fed-
eral remedy or to provide a greater degree of protection for their own
resources and citizens than that provided for by federal statutes.113
A- 7. The Contingency Plan
The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan (NCP),114 created under the CWA and amended under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act,
amended by the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (CERCLA or Superfund), was again amended under the OPA to
provide for an effective and coordinated response to minimize damage
from oil and hazardous substance discharges. The amended NCP is far
more detailed and explicit than the current NCP, which is little more
than outlined in the CWA.I15 The OPA also sets out a timetable and
specific criteria for local contingency plans.1 1
6
8. Licensing Restrictions
Under the OPA, the Secretary of Transportation may not issue a li-
cense or certificate of registry or merchant mariner's document unless
the person applying for the license makes available information con-
tained in the National Driver Register related to the operation of motor
vehicles while under the influence of alcohol and traffic violations involv-
ing reckless driving.' 17 The Secretary has the authority to require indi-
viduals applying for a license or renewal of a merchant mariner's
document to undergo testing for the presence of dangerous drugs.
111. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, §§ 2002, 2003, 2004, 104 Stat.
484, 507 (1990).
112. Id. § 1018(c), 104 Stat. 484, 506.
113. S. REP. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 6, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 728.
114. 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (1990).
115. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 4202, 104 Stat. 484, 527-32
(1990).
116. Id. § 4202, 104 Stat. 484, 527-32.
117. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 4101(a), (g), 104 Stat. 484, 509
(1990). But see 23 U.S.C. § 205(a)(3)(A), (B) (1982).
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9. Improved Tanker Design and Construction
The Coast Guard first proposed mandatory double bottoms on all oil
tankers larger than 20,000 deadweight tons operating in United States
waters in 1973.118 Like oil spill legislation itself, proposals for
mandatory double hulls or bottoms have come and gone many times over
the years. President Carter created a six-point program to reduce the
risks of transporting oil in 1977. Though the President included among
his recommendations double-bottom hulls, the recommendation was not
accepted. " 9
Double bottoms are already required on liquified natural gas carriers.
Only 530 tankers are currently in operation, under construction, or
under contract with double bottoms.' 20 Critics question the safety of
double-bottom hulls, citing the possibility of gas build-up between the
layers and consequent explosions, the possibility that double bottoms im-
pair the ship's buoyancy, making it difficult to salvage and easier to sink
when a grounding occurs, and the possibility of impairment of the ship's
navigability. All of these charges have been refuted by experts, who
counter that salvage is actually easier with double bottoms because the
flooded space between the layers keeps the vessel from going further up
on a reef.'2 ' There have been no explosions among the double-bottom
tankers in service.
Under the OPA, any vessel constructed or adapted to carry oil may
not operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in-
cluding the Exclusive Economic Zone, after January 1, 2010, unless it is
equipped with a double hull or with a double containment system deter-
mined by the Secretary of Transportation to be as effective as a double
hull for the prevention of a discharge of oil. 122
B. Comment
It is early yet to make practical comparisons between the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 and the various statutes governing oil spills that precede it,
but Congress clearly intended to create strong, deliberate, and compre-
hensive legislation.
The OPA covers oil spills in all waters under United States jurisdic-
tion, including the Exclusive Economic Zone. By doing so, the OPA
ensures that regardless of the location of the spill, adequate compensa-
tion and strong financial penalties will be imposed.
Financial penalties imposed on responsible parties are potentially sev-
118. Coast Guard Efforts, supra note 63, at 7 (statement of Mr. Greenberg).
119. Coast Guard Efforts, supra note 63, at 6-7.
120. A. McKenzie, Petroleum Tankers Should Be Built to a Higher Standard, 12(Nov. 6, 1989) (Paper presented to the Committee on Tank Vessel Design, Marine Board,
and National Research Council) (Tanker Advisory Center).
121. Id.
122. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 4115, 104 Stat. 484. 517-22
(1990).
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eral times the amount levied under the Clean Water Act. Civil penalties
under the Oil Pollution Act, for instance, are $25,000 per day, or $1,000
per barrel of oil, for a violation, compared to a limit of $50,000 per viola-
tion under the CWA. This provision means that the penalities for envi-
ronmental damage will more adequately address actual damages, and
compensatory penalties may more fairly compensate.
Responsible parties are more broadly defined under the Oil Pollution
Act and include shippers of oil as well as the vessel's owners and opera-
tors. By widening the net of liability, the OPA may encourage those
responsible for oil transport but not previously held liable to undertake a
greater measure of care in the transport.
Unlike previous legislation, the Oil Pollution Act clearly provides for a
private cause of action to individuals who incur damage to real or per-
sonal property from oil spills. More important, the penalties and liabili-
ties are not subject to the overall limitation of shipowners' liability.123
The OPA also recognizes the practical benefits of mandating preven-
tive safety measures on the human level, by requiring drug testing and
alcohol screening of individuals seeking mariner's documents, as well as
on the larger technical level, by requiring double-hull tankers by the year
2010, by insisting on a more reliable radar tracking system through haz-
ardous waters, and by giving greater shape and substance to the National
Contingency Plan, so vaguely provided for in previous statutes.
Finally, in the area of oil recovery, the OPA leaves less to the discre-
tion of the President than does the Clean Water Act. The OPA flatly
imposes liability for the threatening discharges of oil rather than prohib-
iting discharges "in such quantities as may be harmful as determined by
the President."' 24 Under the OPA, the President "shall ... ensure effec-
tive and immediate removal of a discharge, and mitigation or prevention
of a substantial threat of a discharge of oil ... that may affect natural
resources" in accordance with the National Contingency Plan and any
appropriate area contingency plan. 25 This is a far more forceful direc-
tive than the relatively passive "the President is authorized to remove or
arrange for the removal of such oil . . . unless he determines such re-
moval will be done properly by the owner or operator of the vessel."'
' 26
IV. OIL INDUSTRY INITIATIVES
Exxon's multi-billion-dollar unfinished clean-up effort proved that
even the expenditure of enormous sums of money may not be able to
adequately repair environmental damage. Preventing spills from occur-
123. But see sources cited supra note 58.
124. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1982).
125. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 4201, 104 Stat. 484, 523-24
(1990).
126. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1) (1982).
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ring in the first place is certainly a far better objective. Short of that
objective, better clean-up methods are imperative.
Recognizing this, the oil industry has begun to take a more active role
in mitigating disasters and devising more effective and efficient methods
of clean-up. For example, the American Petroleum Institute is leading
an oil industry effort to deal more effectively with oil spills. The Marine
Spill Response Corporation (MSRC), an independent, privately financed;
nonprofit organization, was recently established to equip and train per-
sonnel to combat catastrophic spills throughout the tidal and offshore
waters of the United States. The MSRC is funded by the Marine Preser-
vation Association, whose members are owners, shippers, and receivers
of crude oil and petroleum products.1 27 The MSRC is also expected to
finance research on the chemical and biological effects of spilled oil on
the environment, as well as techniques for on-water recovery and treat-
ment. Five regional response centers will be established (New York-New
Jersey, Port Everglades in South Florida, Lake Charles in Louisiana, the
Port Hueneme area of Southern California, and Seattle, Washington),
and each center will be capable of responding to a spill of up to 216,000
barrels.
After the Santa Barbara blowout, the Chief Deputy Attorney General
for the State of California remarked
To date, there seems to be only one means of effectively and safely
handling an oil spill. Take one man, one rake, one 10-foot punt, and
one bale of hay. Are they to be the frontline of defense in an industry
which has the technical sophistication required to find oil and drill into
earth for 15,000 feet to get it?128
While booms remain an important tool in oil spill cleanups, Exxon
experimented in Prince William Sound with bioremediation-a process
that encourages indigenous bacteria to consume oil-with positive re-
sults. 129 The oil industry has continued to explore the uses of bi-
oremediation. COREXIT 9580, a chemical developed by Exxon to aid in
oil clean-up, is currently being tested.1
30
Better guidance through difficult waters will also help. Electronic
navigational systems, such as the recently developed Precise Integrated
Navigation System, could give mariners the, ability to "see" water
hazards long before they present a real danger, thus enabling the ship to
steer clear. Standards for such systems have yet to be agreed upon by the
Coast Guard and the International Maritime Organization.' 3 '
127. PR Newswire Assoc., Inc., Sept. 6, 1990.
128. Santa Barbara Oil Pollution: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materi-
als, and Fuels of the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969) (statement by Sen. Moss).
129. News, Exxon Company, U.S.A. (May 20, 1990) (press release).
130. Oil Spill Chronicle, State of Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation,
July 3, 1990.
131. Dane, America's Oil Tanker Mess, POPULAR MECHANICS, Nov. 1989, at 51, 53.
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CONCLUSION
Strong legislation to impose liability on those who cause oil spills and
award sufficient compensation to public and private property damaged
by these disasters is an important step and has been a long time coming.
Stringently and vigorously enforced, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has
the potential to be a powerful tool for the protection of our environment.
The nation's waters and marine environment will depend on it.
Cynthia Carney Johnson

